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The guiding theme of the talk was Stanley Kubrick's masterpiece 'Dr Strangelove', which celebrates its 50th anniversary this year. This classic's depiction of the imponderables - if not downright madness - of nuclear deterrence has lost none of its relevance today, despite the end of the Cold War and the new and diverse issues on the global political agenda. As such, this iconic film served its purpose of reminding students of Global Governance and International Relations that, while less visible and politically salient, the threat of nuclear warheads - of which 16,000 to 17,000 remain ready to be used at a moment's notice - continues to be one of the greatest threats to global security.

If 'risk', as Thomas Nash argued, can be calculated by multiplying the likelihood or probability of an adverse consequence occurring by the magnitude of that consequence, then the risks posed by nuclear weapons are inevitably egregious since their consequences will always be massive. For instance, a 100kT warhead exploding over Manchester would leave 81,000 dead and 212,000 injured within a single minute, and would put 2,598 hospital beds and facilities out of action. What is more, the risks that need to be managed grow in proportion to the number of warheads in existence.

Just how close Soviets and Americans actually came to an abysmal cataclysm was only revealed relatively recently. Sometime during those murky October days of 1962, three Soviet submarine officers stationed off the Cuban coast had to unanimously decide on a response to a US 'cat-and-mouse' depth charge mistaken for a nuclear strike. In fact, only the composure and levelheadedness of one of these officers managed to avert a fully-fledged nuclear war.

In more conceptual terms, Eric Schlosser perfectly articulated the strategic trade-off decision-makers face when dealing with nuclear stocks in a climate of permanent suspicion and mistrust: it is a trade-off between the military's interest in total reliability and civilians' need to prevent any accident or sabotage from occurring. It is to comprehend the distinction between the 'always' and the 'never', so to speak.

Even if the Soviet Union has been relegated to the archives of history and about 80% of Russian and American nuclear stocks have been destroyed, the foundations of this 'madness' - as Eric Schlosser bluntly put it - linger on. While biological, chemical and other weapons have been banned, the nuclear threat remains. Humanitarian law's tendency to lag behind military-technological progress cannot wholly account for this 'legal anomaly'. So what can be done?

First of all, from an IR perspective, and that of a realist in particular, the way forward may be the pursuit of a gradual shrinking of all nuclear stocks. The concurrence of a pro nuclear disarmament US President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense might have provided a unique opportunity for an international agreement, as suggested by Eric Schlosser. Should this be considered a wasted opportunity, in light of Chuck Hagel's ousting? Probably not, as the likelihood of any kind of successful disarmament agreement being concluded by the nine current nuclear states remains more than doubtful, particularly in an environment of rising geopolitical tension where talk of a revived Cold War is rife. Alternatively, are the chances of a further reduction or at least enhanced control and transparency of warheads on the rise? Indeed, decision-makers may feel compelled to act given the current quagmire of failed and failing states in the Middle East and South Asia, not to speak of the erratic caliphate of cutthroats, which raise the terrifying spectrum of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands with potentially disastrous consequences.

That being said, a genuinely promising initiative is the 'International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons' (ICAN), highlighted by Thomas Nash - 'Article 36' being a member of ICAN's International Steering Group. The initiative aims at advancing a global and legally-binding ban on nuclear weapons. An impressive 125 states were party to the first forum in Oslo in 2013. An even more staggering 150 have already signed on for ICAN's next event in 2015. Furthermore, the initiative boasts the support of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the UN Secretary General, and - unsurprisingly - an estimated four out of five people worldwide. The momentum, therefore, is building. Of course, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council - all of which are nuclear powers - have predictably withheld their endorsement thus far. But even here there are glimmers of hope in the signs that the UK may be close to giving in - although this would certainly require prudent dialogue with France, where opposition remains fierce.

Whatever the future of this initiative, its success thus far is undoubtedly an achievement in itself. Born from a network of non-governmental organisations, it builds upon Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which calls for disarmament negotiations in good faith. While only in its second year of existence, ICAN already enjoys high-profile support from a range of international organisations. For Global Governance theorists, this is somewhat reminiscent of the theoretical 'Orchestration' model in which international governmental organisations enlist intermediary NGOs to indirectly and softly push their target - i.e. states - to comply with their norms and prescriptions. This indirect and soft influence may result in nuclear states feeling 'awkward' (Nash) in the midst of progressive neighbours, or companies being compelled to curtail their business activities in certain countries or sectors.

On another theoretical note, the question of discourse deserves some attention as well. At one point in his talk, Thomas Nash forcefully encapsulated ICAN's battle by stating that part of the strategy is to 'reclaim the discourse of disarmament' - a statement that echoes many of the concerns addressed by the Constructivist school of International Relations. To me, and surely to many others , the very issue at hand, its technicality and shivering approach to human life, felt quite estranging. Therefore, the idea of having a treaty as a rallying point to mobilise constituencies and shape a different discourse for today's post-Cold War generation was a most convincing proposition. As a concrete example of the traditional discourse, Nash mentioned the 'quasi-religious' belief in deterrence held by many policy-makers and pundits. According to Schlosser, this belief boils down to medieval hostage taking under the threat of mass murder. Is this what our post-Westphalian state leaders ought to believe in age of unprecedented economic interdependence and transnational integration? After all, as Schlosser poignantly put it, 'who is going to buy the iPads'?

Last but not least, beyond the risk management of current stocks, the issue of nuclear disarmament raises an array of additional and unprecedented questions of interest for future political science and global governance research. For instance, if ICAN gains ground and a treaty becomes a concrete project, how will military alliances and commitments be affected? Which authorities would have the capacity and legitimacy to coordinate and monitor the dismantling of some 17,000 warheads? Who can ensure that no residual nuclear material falls into the hands of pariahs? These are important questions for academics and policy-makers to address and they remind us that while much has been accomplished, the future of nuclear abolition is far from certain. That being said, Eric Schlosser drew the bottom line when he noted, without a hint of cynicism, that "if you have Henry Kissinger calling for abolition, anything is possible".

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