FOREWORD

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Many people have contributed to this project. They are thanked more fully in the acknowledgements at the end of this report. Responsibility for any errors rests solely with the author.

The views expressed in this report are entirely those of the author and do not represent the pos

INTRODUCTION

Section 1

Managing Intergovernmental Conflicts: Key Messages

- 1.1 Conflict management is rarely about some type of formal "dispute resolution" even if sometimes the only way to resolve a particular dispute may be through the courts. Most emerging disagreements are simply swept up in the general, continuous business of intergovernmental relations, where arguments are constantly averted, redefined, accommodated, won and lost.
- 1.2 Few skills and techniques are unique to intergovernmental relations inside devolved or federal states. Many of the lessons will be very familiar to anyone who has any experience of working with other political entities local government, in the EU and in other international bodies or indeed any experience of negotiation and of policy planning in any setting.
- 1.3 Complex issues are most likely to be successfully tackled if the initial focus is on defining the underlying problem and governments' real interests, rather than on developing detailed negotiating positions. See Section 2: Part 1.
- 1.4 In federal and devolved states it is true there will typically be a mass of informal contacts between officials in different governments. However to have the best chance of making progress on the most difficult issues the informal contacts need to operate round a clearly defined core of formal processes. Good working relations form most easily round a well-defined joint task. See Section 2: Part 2.
- 1.5 Individual behaviour and attitudes of officials as well as politicians can have a powerful effect on how easy or difficult relations are between governments. See Section 2: Part 3.
- 1.6 Whether disputes happen and how well they are handled is not just a question of external relations. How well co-ordinated each government is internally also exerts a powerful influence. See Section 3.
- 1.7 There are many right ways to manage an intergovernmental conflict, depending on the particular case and context. By contrast a much smaller number of things consistently go wrong and get in the way of resolving intergovernmental disagreements of all sorts. These and what be done to avoid them or put them right are the key things to understand. Section 2 deals with these things.

MANAGING CONFLICT AFTER DEVOLU

Example

The Productivity Commission is an independent Australian Commonwealth agency, which is permanently available as an inquiry body —roughly equivalent to a permanent Royal Commission. The Commission operates its inquiries by a well established set of procedures and was used repeatedly over the 1990's to open up and refocus arguments about aspects of economic reform. The openness and predictability of the Commission's processes have helped it play an accepted part in a number of intergovernmental discussions.

Example: Social Union Agreement, Canada, February 1999

Canadian governments have drawn up an agreement on principles and procedures for developing social policy. The agreement contains a rare example of explicit intergovernmental dispute resolution arrangements. It is too soon to tell how these will work in practice. What's interesting is the strong link made between dispute resolution and fact-finding, ie:

- "Sector negotiations to resolve disputes will be based on joint fact-finding
- A written joint fact-finding report will be submitted to governments involved, who will have the opportunity to comment on the report before its completion
- Governments involved may seek assistance of a third party for fact-finding, advice, or mediation
- At the request of either party in a dispute, fact-finding or mediation reports will be made public."

http://unionsociale.gc.ca/news/020499_e.html

2.1.4 Zero sum

Zero-sum problems will always be amongst the hardest to resolve. Sometimes one side's gain will only be possible at the other's expense. But every effort should always be made to explore whether a problem really is unavoidably zero-sum.

Packaging up a series of related issues in a negotiation can allow trade-offs. Experience in other countries suggests that trading-off between completely unrelated areas is unusual - not least because it is hard for the negotiators to be up to speed on all the parts of a disconnected package and therefore confident about trading between them. So the more closely linked a package of issues is, the easier it is likely to be find trade-offs.

A classic technique for unblocking a zero-sum conflict over policies in other multi-layered countries is through one side offering the other financial incentives.

Example: Isolating Financial Discussions

Until 1990, Australian Heads of Government used the same forum to discuss how much funding would be allocated to the states and all other inter-governmental issues which needed highest-level political attention. The confrontational atmosphere from the financial discussions constantly spilled over into the discussion of other issues. The decision to split and create a separate Heads of Government body, with a separate title (eventually COAG), meeting on a separate occasion (and preferably not even on a day soon after a financial discussion) is credited by practitioners with having helped governments to make joint progress on other issues.

2.2.2 Process Confused/non-existent

Whatever the problem, if there is no clear process in place for dealing with it, or if the process being used to handle a particular case has emerged over time but never been openly discussed, the risk increases of misunderstanding, lack of progress and frustration.

Experienced intergovernmental practitioners put a lot of effort into jointly addressing process issues early on.

Checklist: Questions to ask early in the process

What issues need to dealt with politically and what can be handled at official level?

What existing structures/ processes will be used and what new ones may be needed?

What is then estimated timetable for dealing with the issue, including "sunset clauses" on any new groups being set up?

What consultation will there be at particular stages?

Will bodies outside governments need to be involved and if so who, when

2.2.4 Inflexible Process

Governments need to be willing to adapt existing machinery and practices to deal with particular issues as they emerge.

In the countries studied for this research, extensive use was made of one-off, fixed-term working groups to look at particular problems.

Because external circumstances change, the longer a particular process is likely to last, the more important it is that there should be continuing high-level monitoring of how it is performing and willingness to adapt it if need be.

Example: Australian Electoral Cycles

There are nine governments in Australia: the federal government, six states and two territories. Elections are not co-ordinated, so most years at least one of the governments will face an election and therefore for a period have to be less active in intergovernmental meetings. The processes need to be able to cope—for example, by avoiding as far as possible the need for political meetings or key decisions while an administration is in purdah and allowing administrations to send officials as observers who can only make a limited contribution. Equally, an unusually long election-free period has been used as an opportunity to take on more complex and long-term issues.

2.2.5 Lacks senior support

Without senior support at political <u>and</u> official level intergovernmental processes will struggle to succeed.

Officials cannot assume that party politics will always be the dominant factor in how willing individual ministers will be to become involved in intergovernmental processes. Personal disposition and a minister's own assessment of what can be gained by negotiating can be just as critical and can bencating can bmc292.8(c)-9.6(a)7.7(n)0 0 Tc 0 Tw / F4 9.51 Tr

How often Heads of Government meet will depend above all on the willingness of the national head of government to use summits. In periods when summits are infrequent, then the official structures and lower-level political meetings can support "summits by correspondence" —but this in particular requires the commitment of the most senior officials and works better where there is some history of face to face meetings between heads of government.

Examples: Pattern of summit meetings in Australia and Spain

The Australian Prime Minister since 1996, John Howard, has been less keen to use COAG meetings than his predecessors, preferring fewer, single-issue summits. Ministerial Councils and COAG Senior Officials have, however, continued to meet regularly and major initiatives, for example on deregulation, have continued to progress. Even without summits, the degree of co-ordinated intergovernmental contact is higher now than it was before 1990. The COAG Senior Officials group still meets regularly.

By contrast, in Spain no pattern of head of government summits involving all regional governments has yet developed and no shadow structure has grown up at the level of civil service heads. Networks of senior officials have however developed around the "sectoral conferences", the range of political councils which has emerged over the past twenty years, which resembles the Ministerial Council network found in Australia.

2.2.6 Fails to take account of wider context

Intergovernmental negotiations in the countries studied are mainly conducted in private between governments - and practitioners emphasised that the more

Checklist: Questions to ask about the wider context

Who are the key third parties - from each side's perspective?

Should this discussion be bilateral or multilateral -do other governments have an interest and need to be involved? The decision not to include another government should be a conscious one, with a clear justification.

This study did not uncover well-

Example: Agricultural and Rural Development Sectoral Conference, Spain

The Spanish Agricultural Sectoral Conference is the forum in which the responsible ministers meet. There is an official-level Commission, which has the specific task of preparing for the political meetings, and beneath that technical working groups can be established, where much of the detail consideration of issues takes place. Although there is no Spanish equivalent to COAG to which issues can be referred, some of the work of the Agricultural Conference does feed into the European Affairs Conference.

Ovil servants play just as critical a role in preparing the way for political meetings and correspondence in intergovernmental relations as in internal government business - but if the work is not done well, the risks are potentially much higher and it will be harder to retrieve the position.

Because bilateral political contacts often tend to be more informal and ad hoc, it

Example: European Affairs Conference, Spain

In Spain the pressure for co-ordination has been most irresistible in European issues and the European Affairs Conference is the only intergovernmental council which is cross-cutting rather than sectoral. Although there has been no general move towards a premiers' conference, the importance to Spain of the European Union and the need for Spain to function effectively in European discussions means not only that the European Affairs Conference is one of the most active parts of the intergovernmental machinery, but also that it became so relatively early on.

Where political relations are personally strained, political staff can provide another channel for getting political soundings.

Even if officials cannot do much to make relationships better, they can make them worse by generating or failing to solve process problems. The less good the political relationship, the more important good practice is across the rest of the system.

2.3.2 Poor negotiating skills

Serious problems are likely if some or all of the people most closely involved have poor negotiating skills.

the relationship of their government is with other governments in their own field of business. This is particularly true in the most senior posts, which have the largest

A variation on this:

The Leaders' Forum in Australia allows state premiers to meet separately from the Commonwealth, resolve differences and reach a common position on issues, often transcending party political divisions.

3.1.2 Need for a clear negotiating mandate

Failure to establish clear and quick internal processes for clearing positions, whether at the start of a negotiation and as its evolves - leaves representatives unable to commit their governments in meetings. Unclear delegations and consequent over-reliance on seeking repeated formal Cabinet approvals denies governments flexibility in negotiations.

Example: Ministerial Councils, Australia

The "Broad Protocols" for Australian Ministerial Councils open with rules for participating governments include:

Representation of Constituent Governments

It is the responsibility of Ministers to ensure they are in a position to appropriately represent their governments at Council meetings. This is of particular importance where Council resolutions require commitment, especially financial commitment, from respective governments.

Issues with cross-portfolio or whole-of-government implications or of a highly controversial nature may require prior consideration by governments at Cabinet level.

Where new issues or alternative proposals arise at meetings on which a Minister believes further consideration by Cabinet is required, it is the responsibility of that Minister to make this position clear to the Council.

http://www.dpmc.gov.au/briefing/doc/Compendium.pdf

3.1.3 Bonds between policy specialists in different jurisdictions

A common feature of the countries studied in this research has been the emergence of strong cross-boundary links between policy specialists in particular fields. If these links are not counter-balanced in some way understandings reached between individual departments in different governments risk:

3.2 Issues for Central Agencies

All these potential problems increase the risk of disputes breaking out between governments or of disputes remaining unresolved for long periods.

The parts of a government which have responsibility for co-ordination between departments and for issues concerning the whole of government are sometimes known as "central agencies". They have to play an active part in managing the overall, long-term relationship between their own government and others. They face 3 critical obstacles:

The sheer volume of activity and the need to be highly selective about when and where to become involved

gaining acceptance by departmental policy specialists of the agency's entitlement to be involved in a particular area

having the authority to enforce particular processes or solutions.

Although none of these obstacles is unique to intergovernmental working, the need to work with other governments gives them an added salience.

3.2.1 Selectivity

Selectivity is both a necessary survival technique for central agencies and a way in which they seek to exercise authority—the more selective central agencies are about their involvement in issues, the more seriously they hope that their interventions will be taken.

In the context of intergovernmental issues, the criteria used to identify issues where central involvement is a priority include cases where:

several departments have a strong interest, particularly where these are likely to conflict

agreement of a funding package is involved, particularly if the funds will be granted on condition that they are spent in specific ways

Intervening in department-level intergovernmental discussions which are not making progress (usually in conjunction with central agencies in other governments)

Becoming the lead department for a period for certain policies.

How? By setting up high-level reporting requirements for departmental processes, at official and political level; by attending intergovernmental meetings on specific policies; by checking cabinet submissions and if necessary requiring further work on any which do not take adequate account of intergovernmental dimensions; by having flexible structures and bringing in specialists on secondment if necessary; by working in partnership with central agencies in other jurisdictions.

3.3 Principles

This suggests some principles for central agency structures, including that they should:

encourage good relations with departments

have clear political and official authority behind them

aim for some compatibility with central agency w21 Tf [6Jw77.1(I)4.8count of inental proceent r somm q

ВТ

Section 4: Final Observations

This section considers some final practical points to consider in managing conflicts and potential conflicts.

4.1 Bilateral or Multilateral?

Intergovernmental discussions are usually made up of a mix of bilateral and multilateral contacts.

Example

Australia makes extensive use of multilateral forums. But bilateral contacts are still used in particular for:

specific implementation issues – for example, the detailed content of each state's Regional Forest Agreement.

Individual casework – for example, the designation of individual World Heritage Stes; most contacts related to inward investment.

More use is made of bilateral contacts in Spain, where multilateral structures are less developed.

Practitioners report that much the same skills and techniques are relevant to multilateral and bilateral dealing. But it is worth being aware that bilateral working tends to be:

more ad hoc and informal

more politically-driven, including more likely to make use of officials in politically-appointed posts.

Bilaterals therefore have to be carefully

Example: Australian Legislative Models

Australia has experimented with various models of joint legislation, with the main approaches:

Centre legislates on behalf of all, with agreement of the states (requires the approval of state parliaments)

Centre legislates on core provisions, states legislate on remaining issues (i) in identical terms; (ii) with liaison on drafting, but not necessarily identical provisions

States pass all legislation - as before possibly in identical terms, but possibly also simply with some liaison on drafting.

4.4 Creating Safe Space for Negotiations: Implementation vs Policy

In Australia, a common response to questions about how officials manage the political sensitivities around particular discussions is to point to a difference between

Section 5: Training and Development

The experience of other countries is that training for devolution should be at least as much about generic skills as specific knowledge.

5.1 Formal knowledge and skills

The key skills will be:

Negotiating skills

5.2 Posting/Staff Development Strategies

Development: experience of having worked on an issue with a devolution dimension should be as broadly spread as possible across governments. It should not simply be seen as a specialism in its own right, but thought of in a similar terms to European issues or finance—something that as many people as possible should have some exposure to during their careers.

Posting: some posts however will have a particularly strong intergovernmental aspect —particularly those in central agencies. The experience and negotiating skills of staff placed in these posts should be given very careful attention. Managers also need to be very sensitive to the risks of bad timing in the turnover of these posts.

5.3 Exchanging Experience

Experience in other countries is that it is very difficult to set up and maintain extensive secondment and interchange schemes—these are only likely to happen on a small scale, very often driven by individuals. The critical issue is to ensure that institutional barriers to movement between administrations—temporary or permanent—are kept to a minimum. It is therefore worth directing organisational energy at making sure pension arrangements, grading/ progression and appraisal systems do not discourage moves by staff. More generally, opportunities for staff to spend time in other jurisdictions should be taken up wherever possible.

Joint training has proved much easier to make work and can be particularly valuable in specific policy areas.

Example: Joint training in Spain

Over the last few years, the National Institute of Public Administration (INAP) has begun to run courses for small joint groups of State and regional officials—around 30 at a time—with the deliberate aim of developing networks across jurisdictions. Regional officials also make particular use of INAP's European affairs courses.

http://www.inap.map.es

5.4 Guidance

In a few specific areas written guidance may be helpful, particularly:

Internal co-ordination: identifying "whole of government" issues (Section 3)

Managing bilateral contacts (Section 4.1)

5.5 Support for senior officials

ANNEX Comparative issues and background to main case studies

This annex provides more detailed background on the two main case studies, Australia and Spain. It also considers briefly the structure of intergovernmental relationships in three other potential comparators—Germany, Canada and the USA and explains why these were not examined in detail for this research. It also suggests further reading and references.

AUSTRALIA

Constitutional type: Federation

Established: 1901, from voluntary union of existing state

governments.

Basis: Written constitution

Form: Commonwealth government covers whole of country,

which is further divided into 6 states and 2 territories.

Division of Powers:

Constitution sets out the scope of Commonwealth powers in general terms, with emphasis on trade and foreign relations, and prohibits states from limited range of activities. Constitution drafted to address preoccupations of 1901 and therefore does not provide clear allocation of powers for some policy areas which have since become significant -for example, the environment. In many areas powers are held to be "concurrent": within the scope of both types of government. Constitution also however provides that "when a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid" (section 109). High Court has ruled that once the Commonwealth has legislated for a particular issue it "occupies the field", enabling the Commonwealth to establish exclusive jurisdiction over many areas the States might also have been able to claim. Territories have similar responsibilities to states, but Commonwealth powers to legislate for territories not limited by the Constitution.

Intergovernmental mechanisms:

High Court hears constitutional cases. Limited constitutional provisions for intergovernmental liaison largely unused.

1.3 The Commonwealth has unlimited power to legislate in relation to the territories. It has rarely used its powers to overturn their legislation, however. The only recent case —overturning a euthanasia law introduced in Northern Territory—was highly controversial. Vehicle was a private member's bill in national parliament, with voting treated as a conscience issue. Both party leaders voted for the bill, but the government and opposition front benches split. All senators from both territories voted as a block against the bill. State premiers were generally critical of the move, regardless of their position on euthanasia or their party affiliation.

Structures

1.4 From day to day, the relations between governments are mediated through a series of bodies which have no legal or constitutional status. This is a critical similarity with the UK, from which flows a series of highly relevant observations about how these structures can be maintained, developed and made to work well.

Central-State Politics

- 1.5 Australia is often observed to be unusually homogenous, compared with other federations and undoubtedly this is true. There is no Australian equivalent to Quebec or the Basque Country. There are important differences between the states. Public servants at both state and Commonwealth level will point to differences in economic interests of the states, rather than party political differences, as providing the best and most abiding predictor of the position a state will take on a given matter often more so than party control.
- 1.6 There are also persistent differences in attitudes towards the federation between the states. In particular Queensland and Western Australia have tended to take a more sceptical line towards the Commonwealth in general. Western Australia was the last state to agree to join the federation; in 1933 the state voted by around 2 to 1 for secession although the vote had symbolic rather than practical impact. As recently as 1994, the Premier of Western Australia published "Rebuilding the Federation: An Audit and History of State Powers and Responsibilities Usurped by the Commonwealth in the Years Since Federation". The state has simply chosen not to become involved in a number of intergovernmental arrangements, or at least to delay its involvement.

1.7

The Queensland Government, for an archive of intergovernmental material http://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/about/igr/index.htm

The Federal-State Relations Committee of the Parliament of Victoria, for a series of useful reports, including comparative summaries of arrangements in other countries, archived at http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/fsrc/default.htm

Reading

There is a reasonable range of published material, although most concentrates on political rather than administrative behaviour.

For a short general overview:

Summers, J. (1997) "Federalism and Commonwealth-State Relations" in Woodward, D., Parkin, A. and Summers, J. (eds) Government, Power and Policy in Australia (6th ed) Longman, Melbourne

For a more detailed analysis of cases:

Painter, M. (1998) Collaborative Federalism: Economic Reform in Australia in the 1990s Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Carroll, P. and Painter, M. (eds) (1995) Microeconomic Reform and Federalism Federal Research Centre, Canberra (Chapters: by Henderson and Edwards on COAG; Hamilton on environmental policy: Kellow on water; Robinson on environmental policy)

Galligan B, Hughes O and Walsh C (eds) (1991) Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy Allen and Unwin, Sydney

Handmer, J. W., Dorcey A. H. J. and Smith D. I. (eds) (1991) Negotiating Water: Conflict Resolution in Australian Water Centre for Resource and Environment Studues, Australian National University, Canberra (Chapters by: Crabb; Dorcey)

Parkin, Andrew (ed) (1996a) South Australia, Federalism and Public Policy Federal Research Centre, Canberra

For a consultancy report into the operation of COAG:

Weller, P. (1995) Commonwealth-State Reform Processes: A Policy Management Review Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra

For an insight into Commonwealth-State political relations, the first diary published by an Australian Cabinet Minister:

Blewett, N. (1999) A Cabinet Diary Wakefield Press, Kent Town

2.	SPAIN

Constitutional type:

proportion of the members, but in practice plays no real part in intergovernmental working.

Finance

Most regions are dependent on a mixture of locally-raised revenue and central government fund transfers. Two (the Basque Country and Navarra) however raise their own taxes and remit a contribution to the centre.

Discussion

Powers

2.2 As in Australia, the powers of the Spanish State are limited by the constitution; the State's actions as well as those of the regions have been challenged often in the Constitutional Tribunal. In practice the regions (including well known cases such as Catalonia) tend not to use their primary legislative powers extensively. Their activity is far more focused on giving policies a distinctive character through Executive powers ie lower level legislation or administrative actions. In general, the Spanish regions, including the most empowered, therefore exercise powers in a way as similar to Wales as Scotland. Spain is often described as comparable to the UK because of its asymmetry. However, differences in powers between regions should not be overestimated, especially since the revisions of the last decade. At least as interesting an area for drawing comparison between Spain and the UK is EU business, where there have been extensive debates about the relationship between the State, as the EU member, and the regions, with their extensive implementation responsibilities.

Structures

2.3 Intergovernmental relations in Spain are relatively politically-driven, with more emphasis on bilaterals and with party politics playing a larger role than in Australia. This is partly due to the history of the settlement, with the current political parties emerging more or less in parallel with the establishment of the new democratic settlement. Also, individual parties have tended to hold office for relatively long periods, both nationally and within regions. This has led to a close association between the institutions of government and individual parties, which some observers argue has tended to prevent the emergence of multilateral structures. This bilateralism has also been encouraged by the requirement for individual regions to negotiate in detail the transfer of central services from Madrid control, after the new constitution was put in place. Some of these negotiations, covering property, funding and staff, lasted several years, creating a bilateral dynamic from the start. Asymmetry creates a further pressure for bilateralism: however, this does not explain why the large number of regions which do have very similar powers do not function at all as a group. Asymmetry alone does not explain the relatively fragmented state of relationships.

Central-Regional Politics

2.4 Questions about the position of the Basque Country and Catalonia, in particular, have played a major part in Spanish politics for decades. For these 2 regions especially to maintain special status has been a priority -but the approach taken by each has been distinct. The Catalan governing party has forged a loose alliance in the national parliament with each of the main parties in turn, to create a majority for key votes, in return for a certain amount of special recognition. There continues to be a huge amount of routine contact between Catalan and State officials across a wide range of issues. The relationship between the Basque and central governments has been more confrontational, by comparison. However, Basques officials are still involved in a large number of formal and informal contacts with central government from day to day. Other parts of Spain have also sought recognition of special characteristics, including Galicia, Navarra, the Balerics and Valencia. Andalucia as a large region with significant economic problems also pursues a distinctive agenda. Intergovernmental politics in Spain is therefore about much more than the Basque or Catalan questions.

Suggested sources

There is very little recent material available in English on the detailed working of Spanish intergovernmental machinery.

Colomer, J. M. "The Spanish "State of Autonomies": Non-institutional Federalism" in West European Politics Vol 21 (4) 1998 pp 40-52.

Aja, E (1999) El Estado Autonomico: Federalismo y Hechos Differenciales Alianza Editorial, Madrid (most detailed contemporary study and lively critique)

Moreno, L (1997) La federalización de Espana: Poder político y territorio Sglo XXI de Espana Editores, Madrid (For the development of the Spanish settlement)

The Ministry of Public Administration in Madrid (Ministerio de Administraciones Publicas) publishes a quarterly bulletin of Constitutional Tribunal statistics (Conflictividad entre el Estado y las Comunidades Autonomas - Boletin Informativo), as well as longer studies which include copies of key agreements, including:

La participacion de las Comunidades Autonomas en los asuntos comunitarios europeos (1995)

Puesta en practica de los Acuedos Autonomicos de 1992 y sus efectos sobre el Estado Autonomico (1996)

3. GERMANY

3.1 The German federal constitution in its current form was established in 1948. The constitution divides responsibilities between the federal government and the sixteen Lander. In intergovernmental relations, the most significant feature of the German settlement is the role of the Bundesrat, the national upper chamber. The

Bundesrat is composed of representatives of the Lander governments - it is an overtly intergovernmental forum. Relations between the tiers are therefore mediated to a considerable extent through relations between the upper and lower chambers of Parliament, with an important role for party groups in each and an inter-chamber dispute resolution machinery. Germany therefore differs in a critical respect from settlements where intergovernmental relations are extra-parliamentary and based on administrative conventions. In terms of the division of responsibilities, the legislative powers of the German Lander are relatively limited: their freedom resides mainly in the implementation of policy with a basic legislative framework. In addition, the national government employs relatively few officials compared to the Lander, whose administrative machinery is used extensively to deliver national programmes. These differences make direct comparisons with Germany difficult in the area of intergovernmental relations, particularly at the level of the detailed strategies used to handle contentious issues. Germany has therefore not been a major source for this study. The German model has however been influential in the design of aspects of the Spanish settlement, in particular the machinery for dealing with European business.

Suggested sources

Jeffery, Charles Memorandum submitted to Select Committee on Scottish

- 5. USA
- 5.1

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